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Abstract. We consider an atomless economy in which the continuum of
agents is represented by a real interval. By dividing the interval and asso-
ciating to every agent in each subinterval the same initial endowments and
preferences, we define sequences of discrete economies as approximations
to the initial continuum economy. We obtain convergence results for the
core (or, alternatively, for the set of Walrasian allocations) of the continuum
economy in terms of the cores of the approximating discrete economies.
Finally, we state some counterexamples which provide a boundary for more
general results in this framework.
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1. Introduction
Since Aumann (1964) introduced a model of a continuum economy and
showed the equivalence between the core and the set of Walrasian alloca-
tions, the hypotheses of nonatomicity and perfect competition have been
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joined. The core equivalence theorem has been refined in many directions,
suggesting that there should be a notion of approximation for which the core
allocations of large economies approximate core (or Walrasian) allocations
of atomless economies. These are important matters for the interpretation
of any equivalence theorem, justifying the attention which we give to this
asymptotic analysis.
The aim of this paper is to discretize a continuum economy providing
a framework to deal with finite approximations of the atomless economy
and to present core (or, alternatively, Walrasian equilibrium) convergence
results.
A standard way to handle a continuous variable on an interval (for in-
stance, in order to calculate or approximate a solution) is to discretize it; this
is to partition the interval, associating to each subinterval a single value. In
our case, under the assumption that a finite number of different characteris-
tics will define an approximation to the atomless economy, a precise initial
endowment and a precise preference relation then identify a group of agents
who are considered identical. The common endowment of agents belonging
to the same type must be given by the average real endowment. However,
it is not clear what preference relation should be associated to each small
subinterval representing the same type of agent. In this paper, we address
first the case where the common preference relation is given by an “average”
preference and then we consider the “unanimous” preference.
In order to formalize these ideas, given a continuum economy we define,
for each n, a new continuum economy with a finite number, namely 2n, of
different agent characteristics. To each one of these new continuum econo-
mies with a finite number of types of agent, we associate a finite economy
with 2n agents. We argue that, as n increases (i.e., as the number of differ-
ent agent characteristics increases or, alternatively, as the number of agents
increases), the initial continuum economy is better approximated by the se-
quence of discrete economies. The main results of this paper are concerned
with necessary or sufficient conditions for an allocation to belong to the core
of the initial continuum economy, in terms of the sequence of allocations in
the core of the associated approximating economies.
A great deal of work has been done on core convergence results, showing
that the proper setting for the theoretical study of competition corresponds
to large economies. In fact, after Debreu–Scarf’s (1963) core convergence
theorem, different formalizations and extensions of Edgeworth’s (1881) con-
jecture have been a major focus of the literature in mathematical economics
during the 70s and 80s (see Anderson (1992) for a survey). In these papers
the theorems state that, for suitable sequences of economies, a measure of the
degree of non-competitiveness tends to zero or, alternatively, an “approx-
imate” decentralization of core allocations in large economies is proved.
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Related works on limit properties of the core include Kannai (1970, 1972)
and Hildenbrand (1974, 1982), who obtain continuity properties of the core
of a market by considering purely competitive sequences of economies (i.e.,
sequences of finite economies for which the number of agents converges to
infinity and the distribution of agents’characteristics in the market converges
to a limit distribution defining an abstract limit economy).
However, we start by considering a continuum economy and then define
a sequence of discrete representations approximating the initial atomless
economy. Moreover, the sequence of discrete economies we define is not
generally a purely competitive sequence of economies converging to the
given continuum economy (as showed in the example given in Sect. 4 and
Examples 5.2 and 5.3 in Sect. 5). Thus, the paper extends the known core
convergence results even if the sequence of discrete economies (obtained
from a continuum economy) is not a purely competitive sequence of econo-
mies converging to the initial atomless economy.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we present definitions and
notation. In Sect. 3 we define sequences of discrete representations of the
continuum economy. In Sect. 4 we present an example, which shows that
the sequences of discrete representations of a continuum economy do not
need to be purely competitive sequences of economies. Therefore, the core
convergence results obtained in this paper cannot be regarded as particular
cases of the well-known core convergence results for purely competitive
sequences of economies. In Sects. 5 and 6 we present the main results of
the paper. In Sect. 5 we study the case in which the common preference
of all agents of the same type is the average preference whereas in Sect. 6
we address the case in which the common preference is the unanimous
preference. In both situations we give examples which provide a boundary
for more general results in this framework.
2. Definitions and notation
We consider a pure exchange economy Ec = ((I,A, µ),Xt , ω(t),t ,
t ∈ I ). The commodity space is the Euclidean space R. Let x = (xh)h=1,
y = (yh)h=1 ∈ R. If xh ≥ yh for every h = 1, . . . , , we write x ≥ y. If
xh > yh for every h = 1, . . . , , we write x  y. For simplicity, we assume
that the space of agents is (I,A, µ), where I is the real interval [0, 1], A
is the Lebesgue σ -algebra of subsets of I , and µ is the Lebesgue measure.
Each agent t ∈ I is characterized by her consumption set Xt = R+, her
initial endowment ω(t) ∈ R+, and her preference relation t .
We state the following assumptions on endowments and preference re-
lations.
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(H.1) The mapping ω : I → R+, that associates to each agent her initial
endowment, is integrable and
∫
I
ω(t)dµ(t) 0.
An allocation is an integrable function f : I → R+. An allocation f is
a feasible allocation if
∫
I
f (t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
I
ω(t)dµ(t).
A preference relation  is (weakly) monotone if x ≥ y implies that
x  y; and it is said to be strictly monotone if x ≥ y and x = y implies that
x  y. The strict monotonicity on preferences was used in Kannai (1970)
and Hildenbrand (1974), addressing continuity properties of the core and
purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively.
(H.2) The preference relation t is a complete, continuous and monotone
preorder for every agent t ∈ I.
Note that (H.2) implies that each t is represented by a continuous and
monotone utility function U(t, ·) : R+ → R (see Eilenberg (1941), Debreu
(1954) or Debreu (1983), pp. 105–110). We denote by C(R+) the set of all
real continuous functions defined on R+. We endow the set C(R+) with the
compact-open topology.
(H.3) The mapping U : I → C(R+), which associates to each agent t ∈
I a utility function U(t, ·) representing her preference relation, is
measurable.
Remark. Note that (H.3) follows from the standard measurability assump-
tion on preferences. To see this, letP denote the set of continuous preference
relations which is a subspace of C, the space of nonempty closed subsets of
R+ ×R+. We consider the closed convergence topology on C. The standard
assumption is that the mapping P : I → P , which associates to each agent
her preference relation, is measurable (seeAumann (1964)). Therefore, there
exists a continuous function U : P ×R+ → R such that U(, ·) is a utility
function which represents the preference relation ∈ P (see Mas-Colell
(1977)). Then, the function V : P → C(R+), given by V() = U(, ·), is a
continuous function (see Wilansky (1983), Theorem 13.3.4). Therefore, the
composition of P with V, U : I → C(R+), which associates to each agent
t ∈ I an utility function Ut ∈ C(R+) representing her preference relation,
is measurable. Thus, by (H.2), Assumption (H.3) is equivalent to the usual
assumption requiring the measurability of the mapping that associates to
each agent her preference relation.
We recall that a coalition of agents is any positive measure subset of the
set of agents. A feasible allocation belongs to the core of the economy if it
is not blocked by any coalition of agents. A coalition S blocks an allocation
f via another allocation g in the economy Ec if
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(i)
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t), and
(ii) g(t) t f (t) for almost all t ∈ S.
We denote by Core(Ec) the set of allocations which belong to the core of
the economy Ec. Given a family F of coalitions, we say that an allocation
f belongs to the F-Core of the economy Ec, and we write f ∈ F-Core(Ec)
if it is not blocked by any coalition S ∈ F .
On the other hand, given a, b ∈ R let a  b be the vector in R+ whose
kth coordinate is max{ak − bk, 0}. Given ε > 0, as in Kannai (1970), we
say that an allocation f belongs to the ε-Core of the economy Ec, and we
write f ∈ ε-Core(Ec) if g(t) t f (t) for almost all t ∈ S implies that the
inequality
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) <
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t) ε does not hold.
3. Sequences of discrete approximations
As we noted in the introduction, our aim is to analyze discrete approxima-
tions to a given economy with a continuum of agents represented by the real
interval [0, 1]. We observe that a standard way to deal with a continuous
variable on an interval is to make it discrete by dividing the interval into
subintervals and associating to each subinterval a single value.
In our case, given a continuum economyEc, for each positive integernwe
define a continuum economy Enc with only a finite number of different agent
characteristics. Specifically, we assume that the set of agents I is divided into
2n pairwise disjoint subintervals, each representing a type of agent. That is,
I =
2n⋃
i=1
I ni , where I ni =
[
i − 1
2n
,
i
2n
)
, if i = 2n, and I n2n =
[
2n − 1
2n
, 1
]
. We
refer to I ni as the set of agents of type i in the economy Enc . In this economy,
the consumption set is R+, and the common preference relation and initial
endowment for all the agents of type i are denoted ni and ωni , respectively.
Let En be the discrete economy associated with the continuum economy
Enc , that is, En is an economy with 2n agents. Each agent i ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} is
characterized by her initial endowment ωni and her preference relation ni .
Observe that an allocation f in our economy Ec can be interpreted either
as an allocation f n in Enc , or as an allocation xn = (x1, . . . , x2n) in En,
where xni = f n(t) =
1
µ(Ini )
∫
Ini
f (t)dµ(t) for all t ∈ I ni . Reciprocally, an
allocation xn in En can be interpreted as an allocation f in Enc or in Ec, where
f is the step function defined by f (t) = xi if t ∈ I ni . In particular, the initial
endowment for the agents of type i in the economy Enc (or for agent i in En)
is ωni =
1
µ(Ini )
∫
Ini
ω(t)dµ(t).
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With xn and f n as above, it is easy to prove that, if xn is blocked by a
coalitionS in the economy En, thenf n is blocked by the coalitionSc =
⋃
i∈S
I ni
in the economy Enc . Moreover, it is straightforward to show that, under
convexity of preferences, xn ∈ Core(En) iff f n ∈ Fn- Core(Enc ), where
Fn denotes the σ -algebra generated by the subintervals I ni , i = 1, . . . , 2n.
For preferences we consider two different scenarios. In Sect. 5, we as-
sume that, for each n, the preference relation ni of agents of type n is
represented by the utility function Un(t, x) = 1
µ(Ini )
∫
Ini
U(t, x)dµ(t) for
each agent t ∈ I ni . In this case, we refer toni as the average preference. We
denote the approximations Enc and En to Ec by E
n
c and En, respectively, when
we consider this average preference. Observe that, if U(t, ·) is continuous
(resp., monotone, strictly monotone, concave) for almost all t ∈ I , then
Un(t, ·) is also continuous (resp., monotone, strictly monotone, concave)
for every t ∈ I and for every n.
Later, in Sect. 6, we assume the unanimous preference relation. Then,
for each n the preference relations are defined as follows:
x ni y ⇔ x t y for almost all t ∈ I ni .
In this case, we refer to ni as the unanimous preference. This preference
states that a consumption vector is preferred to another if, in the economy
Ec, it is preferred by almost all the agents belonging to the subinterval I ni .
When we consider the unanimous preference, we denote the approximations
Enc and En to the atomless economy Ec by Eˆnc and Eˆn, respectively. Observe
that, ift is continuous (resp., monotone, strictly monotone, convex, strictly
convex) for almost all t ∈ I , thenni is continuous (resp., monotone, strictly
monotone, convex, strictly convex) for every i and for all n. Observe also
that the unanimous preference relation is transitive but, in general, it is not
complete.
4. An example
We consider a continuum economy Ec with a single commodity and a con-
tinuum of agents represented by the real interval I = [0, 1], endowed with
the Lebesgue measure µ. We can construct a Cantor-like set K ⊂ I such
that 0 < µ(A
⋂
K) < µ(A) for every open subinterval A of the set of
agents I .
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For each agent t ∈ I = [0, 1], let t be her preference relation, which
is represented by the utility function U(t, ·), given by
U(t, x) =


x if x ≤ 1,
1 if x ≥ 1 and t ∈ K,
x if x ≥ 1 and t /∈ K.
We denote by C(R+) the set of all real continuous functions defined on
R+. Note that the function U : I → C(R+), which associates to each agent
t ∈ I her utility function U(t, ·), is measurable.
We remark that any subinterval of the set of agents I contains a positive
measure set of agents belonging to the Cantor-like setK and a positive mea-
sure set of agents belonging to I \K . Thus, if y < x and y < 1, then every
agent prefers x rather than y; and, if 1 ≤ y < x, every subinterval includes
a positive measure set of agents who prefer x rather than y, and a positive
measure set of agents who are indifferent between x and y. Therefore, for
each n, both the average preference and the unanimous preference are rep-
resented by the same utility function Un(t, x) = x for all agents. Thus, this
sequence of preference relations is strictly monotone and does not converge
(in any reasonable topology) to the preference relations which define the
initial continuum economy Ec.
We recall that a sequence of finite economies is a purely competitive
sequence of economies if the number of agents tends to infinity, the se-
quence of preference-endowment distribution νn converges weakly to a limit
preference-endowment distribution ν, the sequence of mean endowments
converges to the mean endowment given by the limit distribution and this
limit mean endowment is strictly positive (see Kannai (1970) or Hildenbrand
(1974, 1982)).
Thus, the example proves that the sequences En and Eˆn of discrete eco-
nomies obtained from Ec do not result in purely competitive sequences of
economies converging to the limit economy Ec. Moreover, since the Cantor-
like set K may have any measure between 0 and 1, the same conclusions
hold for any voting rule which may define an “aggregate” preference for the
sequence of finite economies. Therefore, the core convergence results stated
in this paper cannot be considered as particular cases of the well-known con-
vergence results addressing purely competitive sequences of economies.
5. Average preference
In this section, we consider sequences Enc and En of discrete economies
defined by the average preference. We remark that most of the assumptions
required in this paper are the standard ones for continuum economies: see,
for instance, Aumann (1964, 1966) or Mas-Colell (1977), where a selection
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of utility functions satisfies Assumption (H.3). Observe that the average
preference relation, as defined in Sect. 3, may depend on the criterion for the
selection of the utility functions representing the agents’preference relations
in the continuum economy Ec. However, we remark that the results we obtain
do not depend on the utility functions chosen for representing the agents’
preferences in the continuum economy.
5.1. Main results
In this section we prove two main results. The first states necessary condi-
tions for an allocation f to belong to the core of the economy Ec, in terms of
the core of its approximating economies En and Enc . The second is a weaker
converse.
Next we state the main result in this section.
Theorem 5.1. Let Ec be a continuum economy under Assumptions (H.1),
(H.2) and (H.3). Let f be an allocation in Ec. The approximation En (resp.,
Enc ) to Ec satisfies the following property:
if xn ∈ Core(En) (resp., f n ∈ Core(Enc )) for all n ≥ n0, then f ∈
Core(Ec).
Remark. Indeed we can see in the proof of the theorem that, if an allocation
f does not belong to the core of the initial continuum economy Ec, then
the corresponding allocation xn does not belong to the core of the finite
economy En for all large enough n. Therefore, we can conclude that, if
f n ∈ Fn-Core(Enc ) for all n ≥ n0, then f ∈ Core(Ec).
The corresponding converse of Theorem 5.1 does not hold, as we show
in Sect. 5.2. However, in the case of strictly monotone preference relations,
we can obtain a weaker converse result. For this, we state the following
assumption.
(H.2)′ The preference relation t is a complete, continuous and strictly
monotone preorder for every agent t ∈ I .
Let Pˆ be the set of all strictly monotone and continuous preorders defined
onR+. Each element∈ Pˆ can be represented by a unique continuous utility
function U such that U(x) = ‖x‖ if x belongs to the principal diagonal (see
Kannai (1970)). Let Uˆ denote the set of all the utility functions obtained as
above. As in Kannai (1970), we consider on Pˆ the metric ρ given by
ρ(1,2) = max
x∈R+
| U1(x)− U2(x) |
1 + ‖x‖2
where Ui belongs to Uˆ and represents i .
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Next, we obtain a weaker converse version of Theorem 5.1 in terms of
the ε-Core concept.
Theorem 5.2. Let Ec be a continuum economy under Assumptions (H.1),
(H.2)′ and (H.3). Let U(t, ·) ∈ Uˆ for almost all t ∈ I . If f ∈ Core(Ec) then,
for each ε > 0, there exists n0 such that, for all n ≥ n0, f n belongs to the
ε-Core of Enc .
5.2. Some counterexamples
Example 5.1. This example shows that the underlying converse result of
Theorem 5.1 is not true. Precisely, we define an economy Ec such that there
exists f ∈ Core(Ec), but f n /∈ Core(Enc ) for all n.
By Cantor’s nested intervals theorem we can take α1, α2, β1, β2, with
0 < α1 < β1 < α2 < β2, such that:
(i) for all odd n and for each i = i(n), j = j (n) ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, with
i = j , such that α1 ∈ I ni and α2 ∈ I nj , we have µ({t ∈ I ni |t < α1}) >
µ({t ∈ I ni |t > α1}) and µ({t ∈ I nj |t < α2}) < µ({t ∈ I nj |t > α2}), and
(ii) for all even n and for each h = h(n), k = k(n) ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, with
h = k, such that β1 ∈ I nh and β2 ∈ I nk , we have µ({t ∈ I nh |t < β1}) <
µ({t ∈ I nh |t > β1}) and µ({t ∈ I nk |t < β2}) > µ({t ∈ I nk |t > β2}).
Let the economy Ec have R2 as commodity space. Each agent t ∈ [0, 1]
is characterized by her initial endowment ω(t) and her utility function
U(t, (x, y)), given by
ω(t) =
{
(1, 0) if t ∈ [0, α1)⋃[β1, α2)⋃[β2, 1],
(0, 1) if t ∈ [α1, β1)⋃[α2, β2),
U(t, (x, y)) =
{
2x + y if t ∈ [0, α1)⋃[β1, α2)⋃[β2, 1],
x + 2y if t ∈ [α1, β1)⋃[α2, β2).
In the economy E2n+1c , though all agents of type i2n+1 prefer the first
commodity, all agents of type j2n+1 prefer the second one. On the other hand,
in the economy E2nc while all agents of type h2n prefer the first commodity,
all the agents of type k2n prefer the second one. It is not hard to show that the
allocation f , given by f (t) = ω(t), belongs to Core(Ec). However, f n /∈
Core(Enc ) for all n. In fact, for each n the coalition S2n+1 = I 2n+1i
⋃
I 2n+1j
blocks the allocation f 2n+1 via g2n+1 in the economy E2n+1c , and the coalition
S2n = I 2nh
⋃
I 2nk blocks f 2n via g2n in the economy E2n+1c . The allocations
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gn are defined as follows:
g2n+1(t) =
{
f 2n+1(t)+ (ε2n+1,−ε2n+1) if t ∈ I 2n+1i2n+1 ,
f 2n+1(t)+ (−ε2n+1, ε2n+1) if t ∈ I 2n+1j2n+1 ,
g2n(t) =
{
f 2n(t)+ (ε2n,−ε2n) if t ∈ I 2nh2n,
f 2n(t)+ (−ε2n, ε2n) if t ∈ I 2nk2n+1,
where εn is any positive real number such that gn(t) > 0.
Observe that, although the functions U and ω are piecewise continuous,
they can be chosen to be continuous, leading us to the same claim.
Remark. The example in Sect. 4 shows that the proof of Theorem 5.2 is
not valid if the strict monotonicity assumed on preferences t is deleted. In
particular, the sequence of average preferences in that example converges, in
the Kannai sense of the metric ρ, to strictly monotone preference relations,
which, therefore, differ from the preferences t considered in the initial
continuum economy. Therefore, Lemma 5 (in the Appendix) does not hold
if t are not strictly monotone.
6. Unanimous preference
6.1. Main results
Our aim is to obtain sufficient conditions and necessary conditions for an
allocation f to belong to the core of the economy Ec, in terms of the cores
of the economies Eˆnc (or Eˆn) defined by the unanimous preference relation.
For this, we state the following continuity assumption.
(H.4) The mapping U : I → C(R+), which associates to each agent t ∈
I a utility function U(t, ·) representing her preference relation, is
continuous with respect to the compact-open topology.
The standard assumption on preferences (see Aumann (1964, 1966))
requires the mapping which associates to each agent her preference relation
to be measurable. As we remark after stating Assumption (H.3) this means
that the mapping U is measurable. Measurability of U implies that, for
& > 0, the function U is continuous on a compact subset K ⊂ I , with
µ(K) > 1− &. Thus, Assumption (H.4) is stronger than (H.3) and requires
continuity of U on I and not only on compact sets with measure 1 − & for
any & > 0.
We will show that Assumption (H.4) is a necessary condition for the next
theorem (see Example 6.3 in the next subsection).
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Theorem 6.1. Let Ec be a continuum economy under Assumptions (H.1),
(H.2)′ and (H.4). Let f be a continuous allocation in Ec. Then the approxi-
mation Eˆnc to Ec satisfies the following property:
if f n ∈ Core(Eˆnc ) for all n ≥ n0, then f ∈ Core(Ec).
Remark. In fact we prove that, if an allocation f is blocked by the coalition
S via g in the economy Ec, then f n is also blocked by the same coalition
S and via the same allocation g in the economy Eˆnc . Moreover, let f be a
piecewise continuous function with simple discontinuities at a finite subset
of D = {i2−n|i = 0, . . . , 2n; n ∈ N}. The proof above shows that, if
f n ∈ Core(Eˆnc ) for all n ≥ n, then f ∈ Core(Ec).
In order to find necessary conditions for an allocation f to belong to the
core of the economy Ec, preference relations are also required to be convex:
(H.5) The preference relation t is convex for almost all the agents t ∈ I .
We recall that a preference relation  is said to be convex if y  x
implies that λy + (1 − λ)x  x for any λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. This is equivalent
to assuming that, if y  x and z  x, then λy + (1 − λ)z  x for any λ,
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 (see Debreu (1959)). Thus, as we deal with preference relations
which are representable by utility functions, (H.5) is equivalent to assuming
quasi-concavity of the corresponding utility functions.
The next theorem is a partial converse of Theorem 6.1. First, we recall that
Fn denotes the σ -algebra generated by the subintervals I ni , i = 1, . . . , 2n.
Now, we define Sn = {f : I → R+|f (t) = fi for all t ∈ I ni , i =
1, , . . . , 2n}. In other words, Sn is the set of all functions which are Fn-
measurable.
Theorem 6.2. Let Ec be a continuum economy under Assumptions (H.1) and
(H.5). Let f ∈ Sn. If f ∈ Core(Ec), then f ∈ Fn-Core(Eˆnc ) for all n ≥ n.
6.2. Some counterexamples
Example 6.1. This example is similar to Example 5.1 and shows that the
converse of Theorem 6.1 is not true. Precisely, we define an economy Ec
such that there exists f ∈ Core(Ec), but f n /∈ Core(Eˆnc ) for all n.
Let α ∈ I be such that, for all odd n and for all i = i(n) with α ∈ I ni , we
have ani < α < bni , where ani = 23
(
i−1
2n
) + 13 ( i2n ) and bni = 13 ( i−12n ) +
2
3
(
i
2n
)
. This implies that µ
({t ∈ I ni |t < α}) < 2µ ({t ∈ Ini |t > α}) and
µ
({t ∈ Ini |t > α}) < 2µ ({t ∈ Ini |t < α}) for all odd n.
In the same way, by Cantor’s nested intervals theorem, we choose β
such that, for all even n, µ
({t ∈ Ini |t < β}) < 2µ ({t ∈ Ini |t > β}) and
µ
({t ∈ Ini |t > β}) < 2µ ({t ∈ Ini |t < β}).
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We consider the economy Ec with the commodity space R2. Each agent
t ∈ [0, 1] is characterized by her initial endowment ω(t) and her preference
relation represented by the utility function U(t, (x, y)), defined as:
ω(t) =
{
(1, 0) if t < α or t > β,
(0, 1) if α < t < β,
U(t, (x, y)) =
{
2x + y if t < α or t > β,
x + 2y if α < t < β.
As in Example 5.1, it is clear that the allocation f , given by f (t) = ω(t),
belongs to Core(Ec). However, if n is an odd number (resp., n is even), then
the coalition Sn = I ni , withα ∈ I ni (resp., withβ ∈ I ni ), blocks the allocation
f n via gn in the economy Eˆnc , where gn(t) = f (t) for all t . To see this,
observe that if, for example, t ∈ Sn with n odd, then
U(t, f n(t)) =
{
2
(
α − i−12n
)
2n + ( i2n − α) 2n if t < α,(
α − i−12n
)
2n + 2 ( i2n − α) 2n if t > α.
Therefore, if t ∈ Sn, thenf (t) is unanimously preferred tof n(t), because
U(t, f n(t)) < U(t, f (t)) for all t ∈ Sn, since max
{
α − i−12n , i2n − α
}
<
2−n+1
3 .
The case n even is much the same.
Example 6.2. This example shows that the continuity of f in Theorem 6.1
cannot be dropped. To prove this, we consider a continuum economy Ec with
two commodities, and let K be a Cantor subset of I , with µ(K) > 0, K =
K1
⋃
K2, with µ(K1) = µ(K2), K1⋂K2 = ∅, and I \ K = ∞⋃
k=1
(ak, bk).
For each agent t ∈ I , let U(t, (x, y)) = (1 + x)1+β(t)(1 + y)1−β(t), where
β : I → R is the continuous function defined as
β(t) =


0 if t ∈ K,
(t − ak)(t − bk) sin
(
1
(t−ak)(t−bk)
)
if t ∈ (ak, bk).
Let A = {t ∈ I |β(t) > 0} and B = {t ∈ I |β(t) < 0}.
The initial endowments are given by
ω(t) =


(1 + γ, 1 − γ ) if t ∈ K1,
(1 − γ, 1 + γ ) if t ∈ K2,
(1, 0) if t ∈ A,
(0, 1) if t ∈ B.
It is easy to prove that, ifK ⊂ S, then the coalitionS blocks the allocation
f = ω via the allocation g, defined as g(t) = (1, 1) if t ∈ K , and g(t) =
f (t) if t ∈ S \K .
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However, f n ∈ Core(Eˆnc ) for all n. To prove this, let us assume that there
exist a coalition Sˆ and an allocation g such that f n(t) = (f n1 (t), f n2 (t)) ≺nt
g(t) = (g1(t), g2(t)). Then, g1(t) + g2(t) > f n1 (t) + f n2 (t) for all t ∈ Sˆ,
which is a contradiction.
To see the last inequality observe that we have three possibilites:
(a) I ni ⊂ A;
(b) I ni ⊂ B;
(c) I ni
⋂
A = ∅ and I ni
⋂
B = ∅.
Consider i such that µ(Sˆ
⋂
I ni ) > 0. If (a) holds, then the agents of type
i prefer commodity 1 to commodity 2, but they do not have commodity 2
and the inequality follows. Case (b) is similar, and finally, if (c) holds, the
inequality follows because the agents in A (resp., in B) prefer commodity
1 (resp., 2) to commodity 2 (resp., 1).
Example 6.3. Now we give an example which shows that, even if the allo-
cation f is a constant function, Theorem 6.1 does not hold if assumption
(H.4) is dropped.
For this, let A, B be disjoint subsets of I such that µ(Ini
⋂
A) > 0 and
µ(Ini
⋂
B) > 0, for all n and i. For example, we can take A and B as
A =
∞⋃
n=1
2n⋃
i=1
Ani , B =
∞⋃
n=1
2n⋃
i=1
Bni
such that Ani , Bni are non-negligible Cantor subsets of I ni , satisfying(
N⋃
n=1
2n⋃
i=1
Ani
)⋂( N⋃
n=1
2n⋃
i=1
Bni
)
= ∅ for all N.
Consider an economy Ec with two commodities. Each agent t ∈ I is
characterized by her endowment ω(t) = (1, 1), and her utility function,
given by
U(t, (x, y)) =


2x + y if t ∈ A,
x + 2y if t ∈ B,
V (t, (x, y)) if t ∈ I \ (A⋃B).
The preferences of agents outside the set A
⋃
B are not relevant in this
example. We remark that, by construction of the sets A and B, the function
U is not continuous.
It is clear that the coalition S = A⋃B blocks the allocation f = ω.
However, f n ∈ Core(Eˆnc ) for all n. This is because, if g(t) = (g1(t), g2(t))
is unanimously preferred to (1, 1) by all t ∈ S with µ(S) > 0, then g1(t)+
g2(t) > 2 for all t ∈ S.
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Example 6.4. Lastly, we give an example which shows that, for the case of
unanimous preference, an analog to Theorem 5.2 fails if the preferences of
the agents are monotone but not strictly monotone. For this, we show that
the fact that an allocation f belongs to Core(Ec) does not imply that, for
each ε > 0, f n belongs to ε-Core(Eˆnc ) for all large enough n.
Consider a continuum economy Ec with a single commodity. Each agent
t ∈ I = [0, 1]has as initial endowmentω(t) ∈ R+, such that
∫
I
ω(t)dµ(t) =
1 and
∫ 1
2
0
ω(t)dµ(t) = 2−1 + α, 0 < α ≤ 2−1. The preference relation of
the agent t ∈ I is represented by the utility function U(t, ·), defined as
U(t, x) =
{
x if x ≤ 2−1 + t,
2−1 + t if x > 2−1 + t.
It is easy to prove that the allocation f , given by f (t) = 2−1+ t , belongs
to the core of the economy Ec. This is because any agent t is satiated with
f (t). However, if ε < α, then f n /∈ ε-Core(Eˆnc ) for all n. In fact, we
claim that, for every n, f n is blocked by the coalition S = [0, 2−1) via
g(t) = 1 for every t ∈ S. To prove our point, let tni be the midpoint of
the subinterval I ni . Then for all I ni ⊂ S, g(t) = 1 is strictly preferred to
f n(t) = 2−1 + tni for every agent t ∈
(
tni ,
i
2n
)
, and is indifferent for all the
agents t ∈
[
i − 1
2n
, tni
]
.
Appendix: Proofs
Before presenting the proof of Theorem 5.1, we state several lemmas. For
this, for z ∈ Q we define -(z) = {t ∈ I |U(t, z + ω(t)) > U(t, f (t))},
and -n(z) = {t ∈ I |Un(t, z + ωn(t)) > Un(t, f n(t))} for each n ∈ N. Let
Z = {z ∈ Q|µ(-(z)) = 0} and, for each agent t ∈ I , let ψ(t) = {z ∈
R|U(t, z+ ω(t)) > U(t, f (t))}.
Lemma 1. Let S be a coalition of agents blocking the allocation f in the
economy Ec. Then, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , +1}, there exist αi ∈ Q+, zi ∈ Q,
and ti ∈ Sˆ = S \ ⋃z∈Z -(z) such that
+1∑
i=1
αi = 1,
+1∑
i=1
αizi = 0, and
zi ∈ ψ(ti).
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Proof. As S blocks f , there exists g : S → R+ such that
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ≤∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t) and g(t) t f (t) for almost all t ∈ S. As µ(⋃z∈Z -(z)) = 0,
Sˆ is a coalition which also blocks f by the same allocation g.
Let co(A) denote the convex hull of the set A. Then
1
µ(Sˆ)
∫
Sˆ
(g(t) −
ω(t))dµ(t) ∈ co
(
(g − ω)(Sˆ)
)
(see Hu¨sseinov (1987, 1994)). Therefore,
0 ∈ co (⋃t∈Sˆ ψ(t)). By Caratheodory’s theorem, one obtains that there
exist αi ≥ 0, and zi ∈ ψ(ti), with ti ∈ Sˆ, i = 1, . . . ,  + 1, such that
0 =
+1∑
i=1
αizi . By continuity and monotonicity of preferences, we can take
αi ∈ Q+ and zi ∈ Q with
+1∑
i=1
αi = 1,
+1∑
i=1
αizi = 0 and zi ∈ ψ(ti).  unionsq
Lemma 2. For each ε > 0 there exists Jε ⊂ I , with µ(Jε) > 1 − ε, such
that, for each t ∈ Jε, Un(t, ·) converges to U(t, ·) uniformly on compact
subsets of R+.
Proof. For x ∈ R+, by the Lebesgue differentiation theorem, Un(t, x) con-
verges to U(t, x) for almost all t ∈ I . In particular, for each x ∈ Q+ there
exists J (x) ⊂ I , withµ(J (x)) = 1, such thatUn(t, x) converges toU(t, x)
for all t ∈ J (x). Let J = ⋂x∈Q+ J (x). Then µ(J ) = 1 and Un(t, x)
converges to U(t, x) for all t ∈ J .
On the other hand, by (H.3)U is measurable. Lusin’s theorem guarantees
that, for each ε > 0, there exists a compact set I& ⊂ I , with µ(Iε) > 1− ε,
such thatU is continuous on I& . Note thatµ(Jε) > 1−ε, where J& = J ⋂ Iε.
We show thatUn(t, x) converges toU(t, x) for all t ∈ Jε, for anyx ∈ R+.
First, given x ∈ R+, let (xk) ⊂ Q+ be a sequence such that xk → x. Then,
lim
k→∞U
n(t, xk) = Un(t, x) for all n and for all t ∈ I and lim
n→∞U
n(t, xk) =
U(t, xk) for all k and for all t ∈ Jε. Moreover, this last convergence is
uniform in k. In fact, let K = {U |Jε (·, xk), k ∈ N}, where U |Jε denotes
the restriction ofU to Jε. AsU is continuous on Jε, we conclude thatK is an
equicontinuous set. Therefore, applying Ascoli–Arzela’s theorem, Moore’s
lemma and result IV.8.18 in Dunford–Schwartz (1958), we conclude that
Un(t, x) converges to U(t, x) for all t ∈ Jε and all x ∈ R+.
Finally, reasoning as before, we see that lim
n→∞U
n(t, xn) = U(t, x) for all
t ∈ Jε. That is, following Carathe´odory’s notion of continuous convergence
(see Royden (1988), Problem 7.40), if t ∈ Jε, then Un(t, ·) converges to
U(t, ·) uniformly on compact subsets of R+.  unionsq
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Lemma 3. The function Un(·, ·) converges to U(·, ·) almost uniformly on I
and uniformly on compact subsets ofR+. That is, for a compact setK ⊂ R+,
for each ε > 0 there exists Jε ⊂ I , with µ(Jε) > 1 − ε, such that Un(·, ·)
converges to U(·, ·) uniformly on Jε ×K .
Proof. Let ε > 0. By Lemma 2, there exists J ⊂ I , with µ(J ) > 1 − ε2 ,
such that, for all t ∈ J, Un(t, x) converges to U(t, x) for all x ∈ R+, and
this convergence is uniform on K . Given k,m positive integers, we define
Jk,m =
{
t ∈ J
∣∣∣∣ | Un(t, x)− U(t, x) |< 1m for all n ≥ k, x ∈ K
}
Then, by the uniform convergence on K for all t ∈ J , we have that J =⋃∞
k=1 Jk,m for all m. So, for each m, we see that there exists k(m) such that
µ(J \ Jk(m),m) < ε2−m−1. Let Jε =⋂∞m=1 Jk(m),m. Then, µ(J \ Jε) < ε and
therefore, Un(·, ·) converges to U(·, ·) uniformly on Jε ×K .  unionsq
Proof of Theorem 5.1. Observe that, if the allocation xn does not belong
to Core(En), then the corresponding allocation f n does not belong to Fn-
Core(Enc ), and that Core(E
n
c ) ⊂ Fn-Core(Enc ). Thus, it is enough to prove
the result for En.
For this, suppose that f /∈ Core(Ec). Then, a coalition S blocks f and,
by Lemma 1, there exist αi ∈ Q+ and zi ∈ ψ(ti), i = 1, . . . ,  + 1, with
ti ∈ Sˆ = S \⋃z∈Z -(z) and
+1∑
i=1
αi = 1, such that 0 =
+1∑
i=1
αizi .
By the definition of Sˆ, as zi ∈ ψ(ti), we have that µ(-(zi)) > 0. So,
there exists α > 0 such that µ(-(zi)) ≥ α for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,  + 1}.
Thus, zi ∈ ψ(t) for all t ∈ -(zi), Therefore, there exist Bi ⊂ -(zi), with
µ(Bi) <
α
8 , and δ > 0, such that U(t, zi + ω(t)) − U(t, f (t)) ≥ δ for all
t ∈ -(zi) \ Bi .
On the other hand, there exist A ⊂ I , n0 and a compact K ⊂ R such
that µ(A) < α8 and f (t), f
n(t), zi + ωn(t) ∈ K for all t ∈ A and for all
n ≥ n0. By Egoroff’s theorem (see Royden (1988)) and Lemma 3, there
exists a set of agents B ⊂ I , with µ(B) < α8 , such that f n(t) → f (t),
ωn(t) → ω(t) and Un(t, x) → U(t, x) uniformly for all t /∈ B and for all
x ∈ K .
For each ε > 0, consider the map ϕ(·, ε) : I → R+ given by
ϕ(t, ε) = sup
x∈K
‖y‖≤ε
| U(t, x + y)− U(t, x) | .
Note that ϕ(t, ε) converges to 0 when ε → 0. Let Iε = {t ∈ I |ϕ(t, ε) < δ4}.
As I =⋃ε Iε, there exists ε0 such that µ(I \ Iε0) < α8 and ϕ(t, ε0) < δ4 for
all t ∈ Iε0 .
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Let-′(zi) =
(
-(zi)
⋂
Iε0
)\(A⋃B⋃Bi). Thenµ (-′(zi)) > α2 . More-
over, f n (resp., ωn) converges to f (resp., to ω) uniformly on -′(zi). So,
there exists n1 such that ‖f n(t)−f (t)‖, ‖ωn(t)−ω(t)‖ < ε0 for all n ≥ n1
and t ∈ -′(zi). By the uniform convergence of Un(t, x) with t ∈ -′(zi)
and x ∈ K , there exists n2 such that | Un(t, x) − U(t, x) |< δ4 for all
x ∈ K , t ∈ -′(zi) and n ≥ n2. In the same way, there exists nˆ such
that -′(zi) ⊂ -n(zi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,  + 1} and n ≥ nˆ. Moreover,
µ (-n(zi)) >
α
2 .
On the other hand, for each i we can write αi = βiβ , with βi, β ∈ N and
βi ≤ β. By the definition of -n(zi), for each n ≥ nˆ and i, there exists a type
subset T ni ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n} such that -n(zi) =
⋃
j∈T ni I
n
j . As µ(Inj ) converges
to zero when n goes to ∞, but simultaneously µ (-n(zi)) > α2 > 0, we see
that there exists n∗ such that Card(T ni ) > β for all i and n ≥ n∗. Consider
J ni ⊂ T ni with Card(J ni ) = βi . Given n ≥ n∗, let yn be an allocation that
associates to each agent j ∈ J ni the consumption vector ynj = zi + ωn(tj,i),
with tj,i ∈ I nj ⊂ -n(zi), 1 ≤ j ≤ βi . Then, the coalition J n =
⋃+1
i=1 J
n
i
blocks the allocation xn for n ≥ n∗ because
+1∑
i=1
βi∑
j=1
(
zi + ωn(tj,i)
) = +1∑
i=1
βizi +
+1∑
i=1
βi∑
j=1
ωn(tj,i)
= β
+1∑
i=1
αizi +
+1∑
i=1
βi∑
j=1
ωn(tj,i) =
+1∑
i=1
βi∑
j=1
ωn(tj,i).  unionsq
Before giving the proof of Theorem 5.2, we present the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let (n) ⊂ Pˆ,∈ Pˆ and let Un, U in Uˆ be the utility functions
representing n and , respectively. Then, ρ(n,) converges to zero iff
Un converges to U uniformly on compact subsets of R+.
Proof. For the necessary condition, let ε > 0, K be a compact subset ofR+
and r be such that K ⊂ B(0, r) = {x ∈ R+; ‖x‖ < r}. Asn ρ→, for each
εˆ = ε
1 + r2 , there exists n0 such that ρ(n,) ≤ εˆ for all n ≥ n0. Thus,
multiplying and dividing by 1+‖x‖2, we get max
x∈K | Un(x)−U(x) |≤ ε for
all n ≥ n0.
For the sufficient condition, let ε > 0. As Un,U ∈ Uˆ , there exists a
constant k, which only depends on , such that Un(x) ≤ k‖x‖ and U(x) ≤
k‖x‖ for all n and x ∈ R+. Let r > 1 be such that
2kr
1 + r2 < ε. As Un
converges to U uniformly on K = {x ∈ R+; ‖x‖ ≤ r}, there exists n0 such
that max
x∈K | Un(x)− U(x) |≤ ε for all n ≥ n0.
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Then, we show that max
x∈K
| Un(x)− U(x) |
1 + ‖x‖2 ≤ ε for all n ≥ n0. If x /∈ K ,
as ‖x‖ > r > 1, then
| Un(x)− U(x) |
1 + ‖x‖2 ≤
| Un(x) | + | U(x) |
1 + ‖x‖2 ≤
2k‖x‖
1 + ‖x‖2 ≤
2kr
1 + r2 .
This allows us to conclude that max
x∈R+
| Un(x)− U(x) |
1 + ‖x‖2 ≤ ε for alln ≥ n0.
 unionsq
Lemma 5. For each agent t ∈ I , lett (resp.,nt ) be her preference relation
in the economyEc (resp.,Enc ), represented by the utility functionU(t, ·) (resp.
Un(t, ·)). Suppose that U(t, ·) ∈ Uˆ for almost all t ∈ I . Then, for every
ε > 0, there exists Iε ⊂ I , withµ(Iε) > 1−ε, such thatρ(nt ,t ) converges
to zero for every t ∈ Iε.
Proof. As U(t, x) = ‖x‖ for all x in the principal diagonal of R+ and for
almost all t ∈ I , we see that Un(t, ·) ∈ Uˆ for all t ∈ I and n.
On the other hand, by Lemma 2, for every ε > 0, there exists Iε ⊂ I ,
with µ(Iε) > 1 − ε, such that Un(t, ·) converges to U(t, ·) uniformly on
compact subsets of R+ for every t ∈ Iε. Therefore, applying Lemma 4.4,
we conclude that ρ(nt ,t ) converges to zero for every t ∈ Iε.  unionsq
Proof of Theorem 5.2. We recall that f n is a feasible allocation in Enc and
f n(t) converges to f (t) for almost all t ∈ I . On the other hand, as ωn
converges weakly to ω, the set {ω,ωn : n ∈ N} is a weakly sequentially
compact subset of L1(I ). Restricting ourselves to Iε, as in the statement of
Lemma 5, with ε small enough, it is easy to prove that Lemma 5.3 in Kannai
(1970) holds. Therefore, the proof of Theorem C in Kannai (1970), on con-
sideration of our restriction to the corresponding Iε, proves our statement.
 unionsq
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Assume that f /∈ Core(Ec). Then, there exist a coali-
tion S and g : S → R+ such that
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) #
∫
S
ω(t)dµ(t), and
U(t, g(t)) > U(t, f (t)) for all t ∈ S. As ωn converges weakly to ω in
L1(I ), there exists n0 such that
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ωn(t)dµ(t) for all n ≥ n0.
Moreover, by Lusin’s theorem we can choose S to be compact and g to be
continuous on S (see Hildenbrand (1974), p. 140).
By the continuity properties ofU , f and g, there exists ε > 0 such that, if
εˆ = (ε, . . . , ε) ∈ R+, thenU(t, g(t))− ε2 > U(t, f (t)+εˆ)+ ε2 for all t ∈ S.
Since f n converges to f uniformly on S, there exists n1 = n1(ε) such that
f (t) + εˆ ≥ f n(t) for all t ∈ S and n ≥ n1; and there exists K , a compact
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subset of R+, such that f (S), g(S), f n(S) ⊂ K . So, by monotonicity of
preferences we see that U(t, g(t))− ε2 > U(t, f n(t))+ ε2 for all t ∈ S.
On the other hand, asU is continuous, there exists δ = δ(ε,K) such that,
if | t − t ′ |< δ and x ∈ K , then | U(t ′, x) − U(t, x) |< ε2 . Let n2 be such
that 2−n2 < δ, and let n¯ = max{n0, n1, n2}. Thus, if n ≥ n¯ and | t − t ′ |< δ,
then U(t ′, g(t)) > U(t, g(t))− ε2 and U(t, f n(t))+ ε2 > U(t ′, f n(t)).
Note that, if n ≥ n¯, then | t − t ′ |< δ if t, t ′ ∈ I ni , whatever i may be.
Therefore, U(t ′, g(t)) > U(t ′, f n(t)) for all n ≥ n¯ and t, t ′ ∈ I ni . So, we
can conclude that the coalition S blocks f n via g in the economy Enc .  unionsq
Next we state a lemma which is used in the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Lemma 6. Assume that t is convex for almost all t ∈ I ni . Let S ⊂ I ni ,
µ(S) > 0. Let g : S → R+ be a µ-integrable function and let x ∈ R+ be
such that g(t) ni x for all t ∈ S. Then
1
µ(S)
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ni x.
Proof. Let A = {y ∈ R+|y ni x}. First, we show that A is a convex set.
For this, let y1, y2 ∈ A. Then y1 t x, y2 t x for almost all t ∈ I ni and
there exist S1, S2 ⊂ I ni , with µ(S1) > 0 and µ(S2) > 0, such that y1 t x
for all t ∈ S1 and y2 t x for all t ∈ S2. Let yλ = λy1 + (1 − λ)y2
with 0 < λ < 1. By convexity of the preferences, yλ t x for almost all
t ∈ S1⋃ S2. Thus, yλ ∈ A. Therefore A is a convex set. As g(S) ⊂ A and
1
µ(S)
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ∈ co(g(S)) (see Hu¨sseinov (1987, 1994)), we conclude
that
1
µ(S)
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ni x.  unionsq
Proof of Theorem 6.2. Suppose thatf /∈ Fn-Core(Eˆnc ) for somen ≥ n. Then,
there exist S ∈ Fn and g : S → R+ such that
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t) ≤
∫
S
ωn(t)dµ(t)
and g(t) nt f (t) for all t ∈ S. Let TS ⊂ {1, . . . , 2n} be such that S =⋃
i∈TS I
n
i . Then g(t) ni fi for all t ∈ I ni , with i ∈ TS . For each i ∈ TS , let
gi = 1
µ(Ini )
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t).
Consider g˜ : S → R+ given as g˜(t) = gi if t ∈ I ni . By construction, we
see that
∫
S
g˜(t)dµ(t) =
∫
S
g(t)dµ(t). By Lemma 6, gi ni fi for all i ∈ TS .
By the definition of unanimous preference ni , this is equivalent to the fact
that for each i ∈ TS there exists Sni ⊂ I ni , withµ(Sni ) > 0, such that gi t fi
for almost all t ∈ I ni , and gi t fi , for all t ∈ Sni . Therefore, the allocation
f is blocked by the coalition S in the economy Ec.  unionsq
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